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1. Introduction 
Both Martin Heidegger and Harry Frankfurt have argued that the fundamental feature of 
human identity is care.  Both contend that caring is bound up with the fact that we are mortal 
beings related to our own impending death, and both have claimed that caring has a non-
instantaneous, future-oriented, and ultimately circular temporal structure.  In this chapter, I argue 
that Heidegger’s conception of the temporal articulation of caring elucidates a misunderstanding 
at the heart of Frankfurt’s view of the relations among care, death, and time.  The temporal, 
existential, and normative significance that Frankfurt finds in a hard-wired instinct for self-
preservation, what he calls a person’s “love of living,” is more compellingly captured by 
Heidegger‘s idea that a human identity is lived out in the manner he calls “being-toward-death.” 
 
2. Preliminary Remarks 
Heidegger gives the name “care” [Sorge] to the ontological structure of human existence 
that he spells out in Being and Time.  He contends that for me to be a person, or “Dasein,” is for 
me to relate to my life by caring about it.   My own being is an issue or at stake for me.  
Heidegger writes that “any entity is either a ‘who’ [a person or Dasein] … or a ‘what’ [a mere 
thing or object],” adding that, for the latter, “their being is [to them] ‘a matter of indifference’ 
[gleichgultig]; or more precisely, they ‘are’ such that their being can be neither a matter of 
indifference to them, nor the opposite” (Heidegger 1962: 71, 68, my gloss in the brackets).1 
The phenomenon of care, according to Heidegger, cannot be captured by the everyday 
conception of time as a linear sequence of discreet now-points.  Care stretches our time; it has an 
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“ecstatically” articulated and ultimately circular temporal structure Heidegger describes as 
“being-ahead-of–myself-already-in-the-world.”   Put abstractly, to care is to be related to the 
present by way of pressing into the future on the basis of what already matters.  Caring, 
Heidegger contends, is rooted in how I already find myself, yet it is essentially futural (BT 376).  
To care is thus to have final ends “for the sake of which” we carry out our daily activities 
and in terms of which we organize our time and have a meaningful orientation in our everyday 
world (See BT 116-119).2  The final ends that define our identities are not goals that we aim to 
achieve at some discreet now-point in the future and then leave behind in the past.   They are that 
“towards-which” a person always conducts himself.  It is helpful here to appeal to an example 
from William Blattner’s discussion of this point: the difference between having the goal of 
getting tenure and having the identity of being a teacher (Blattner 1999: 39-43). The goal is 
something you aim at, achieve at a certain moment, and then ‘leave behind’ in the past.  But 
futural final ends that define a person’s identity of being a professor remain “always 
outstanding”; they are never “settled” or “actualized” and left in the past, at least as long as the 
person understands and identifies himself in the relevant way. That is one thing Heidegger means 
by claiming “Dasein is constantly ‘more’ than it factually is,” and that Dasein  “is existentially 
that which … it is not yet (BT 185-186, cf. 287). The “not yet” here is the ecstatic “stretching 
out” into the dimension of the future that is characteristic of care according to Heidegger. 
Frankfurt has been interested in the same realm of phenomena.  With a feigned 
tentativeness, he writes: “Perhaps caring about oneself is essential to being a person.  Can 
something to whom its own condition and activities do not matter in the slightest properly be 
regarded as a person at all? Perhaps nothing that is entirely indifferent to itself is really a 
person”(Frankfurt 1999a: 89-90).  Especially since his essay “The Importance of What We Care 
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About,” Frankfurt has consistently sought to distinguish caring from the over-burdened notion of 
desire.  He does so in terms of their differing “temporal characteristics”:  while desire has “no 
inherent persistence” and can obtain in a merely instantaneous present “now,” caring is 
essentially “prospective,” involving, as Heidegger saw, a futural thrust: “The outlook of a person 
who cares about something is inherently prospective; that is, he necessarily considers himself as 
having a future” (Frankfurt 1988: 83).  Frankfurt contends, again in a Heideggerian vein, that 
caring provides “continuity and coherence to a life” (Frankfurt 1999e: 162) and prevents it from 
being merely a sequence of events” (Frankfurt 1988: 83).   Echoing Heidegger’s denial that the 
temporality of care can be understood as a “pure sequence of ‘nows’”(BT 377), Frankfurt 
remarks that the “moments in the life of a person who cares about something…are not merely 
linked inherently by formal relations of sequentiality” (Frankfurt 1988: 83).  Caring is a matter of 
the person’s “continuing concern with what he does with himself and with what goes on in his 
life” (Frankfurt 1988: 84).  
Both Heidegger and Frankfurt relate the phenomenon of care and its futural directedness 
to the fact of human mortality.  In his later work, Frankfurt claims that the instinctual avoidance 
of death, a manifestation of what he calls the “love of living,” plays “a comprehensively 
foundational” role in the constitution of personal identity and in grounding the importance of 
what we care about (Frankfurt 2006b: 41).3  Heidegger agrees that human mortality is somehow 
the source of importance in human life.  However, Heidegger would strongly reject Frankfurt’s 
understanding of the significance of death in terms of a naturalistic, instinct-conception of care.   
In Frankfurt’s efforts to rebut the claims of Kantian rationalism, a still widespread view 
that sees reflective self-consciousness and rational principles at the core of human identity, he, 
like Heidegger, holds up care as a phenomenon that does not depend upon and indeed enjoys a 
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certain priority over reason or reflective self-consciousness.  Frankfurt, though, does not see how 
to defend this anti-rationalism without swinging all the way to the opposite dialectical extreme 
and defending an implausible foundationalist naturalism in his conception of care.   
Frankfurt mistakenly sees the priority of care over rational self-consciousness as 
implying the priority of the factual over the normative in questions of human identity.  He 
understands the “love of living” as the “biologically embedded” instinct for self-preservation 
(RL 30), a fundamental and defining personal commitment that is “determined for us by 
biological and other natural conditions, concerning which we have nothing much to say” (RL 
48). Frankfurt thus conceives the most fundamental commitments definitive of a person’s 
practical identity —what he calls “volitional necessities”— on the model of natural facts about 
which normative questions of justification, appropriateness, or evaluation cannot arise at all.   
From Heidegger‘s perspective, this is to misunderstand the significance of the relation 
between caring, dying, and human identity.   Heidegger’s emphasis on care is also part and 
parcel of his overall anti-rationalism.  Yet Heidegger’s view helps us see how Frankfurt’s 
naturalistic interpretation of volitional necessity is motivated by a misunderstanding of the 
significance of the temporal structure of caring.  For Heidegger, human identity cannot bottom-
out in any fundamental commitments that are hard-wired like natural facts.  Against Frankfurt’s 
naturalist foundationalism about ultimate personal commitments, Heidegger would emphasize 
that the question of who I am can always arise anew and that my identity remains ever at stake.  
According to Heidegger, there are no substantive commitments that are in principle immune to 
revision or rejection; not even the ones Frankfurt claims are biologically embedded in human 
nature.   In order to understand all that is at stake in this nest of issues, we need to back up and 
get more details of these arguments on the table. 
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3. Frankfurt on Identity and Care 
 
Frankfurt launches his reflections on caring by considering what is involved in posing 
and answering what I will call “the practical question,” the question that asks:  “Who am I going 
to be? What am I going to do?”  According to Frankfurt, answering this question takes the form 
of hierarchically ordering the relative importance of the things a person cares about (RL 23). 
This is because a person’s caring about something “consists…in the fact that he guides himself 
by reference to it” (Frankfurt 1999c: 111).  The important thing about caring is not captured by 
thinking of it as some kind of affective or cognitive state.  Caring is a matter of having certain 
practical dispositions; it is about what I am prepared or able to do. 
Ranking the relative importance of the things I care about clarifies for me how I can carry 
out my life in terms of what is of “greatest importance” to me (Frankfurt 1999d: 132) so that I 
have something worthwhile to do rather than being bogged down in paltry trivialities or being 
dispersed in activity that is merely “locally purposeful but nonetheless fundamentally aimless” 
(RL 89, 53).4  Living in terms of what you care about enables you to live a meaningful life 
characterized by “a fundamental kind of freedom” (RL 53, 97, 99).  Caring about something (a 
person, ideal, cause, etc.) consists in the fact that the person is effectively motivated to pursue its 
good or interests, structures his activities in accordance with them, and is affectively vulnerable 
to their diminishment or enhancement (Frankfurt 1988: 83).  Hence, caring involves the person 
both practically and affectively in his own life and activities.  To see why this counts as a 
meaningful life, it helps to consider what a meaningless life consists of for Frankfurt.  If a person 
did not care about anything, Frankfurt claims, he would “languish”:  “the results would be a 
fragmentation of life, passivity, and boredom” (Frankfurt 1999a: 88).  Why is a carefree life 
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boring?  Because nothing matters.  Again, mattering is not a subjective feeling; it is largely a 
pragmatic notion.  Mattering means there is something you have got to do. 
The specter of boredom accordingly comes to hold a central position in Frankfurt’s 
middle and late analysis of the self.5  “Boredom,” he writes, “is a serious matter.  It is not a 
condition that we seek to avoid because we do not find it enjoyable.  In fact, the avoidance of 
boredom is a profound and compelling human need” (RL 54).6  Frankfurt even claim that 
“avoiding boredom … expresses a quite primitive urge for psychic survival… [an urge 
appropriately construed] as a variant of the universal and elemental instinct for self-preservation” 
(RL 54-55, my gloss).7  
Reflectively posing the practical assists one in coming to a wholehearted (i.e., non-
ambivalent) identification with or acceptance of the motivations that the person finds move him 
to act.  “Being wholehearted means having a will that is undivided. The wholehearted person is 
fully settled as to what he wants, and what he cares about” (RL 95).  But this being “fully 
settled” presupposes that the person “understand[s] what it is that [he himself] really care[s] 
about, and [that he is] decisively and robustly confident in caring about it” (RL 28).  Asking the 
practical question is aimed at “articulating what we are to care about” and enabling us “to get 
clear concerning what is to be important to us” (Frankfurt 1999a: 92).  In Frankfurt’s picture, as 
in Heidegger’s, to be guided in your action by what you care about is to be identified with your 
motivations and thus to be autonomous, “self-owned” (“authentic” [eigentliche] in Heidegger’s 
term). For both, such autonomy is a response to your receptive sense of the way things already 
matter.  However, Frankfurt and Heidegger understand the significance of this “already” and the 
experience of being identified with it in radically different ways. 
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4.  The Circular Structure of Care   
Both Frankfurt and Heidegger see the phenomenon of care as having a distinctive 
temporal articulation:  while being essentially futural or prospective (caring gives us something 
to do, it orients and moves us toward the execution of certain ends), it is rooted in a pre-
constituted situation in which a person already finds himself.  The peculiar interrelationship 
between the past and futural dimensions of caring shows that it has a temporally circular 
structure, one that comes to light especially when we consider how caring shapes the way a 
person deliberatively poses and answers the practical question.  Both Frankfurt and Heidegger 
see that this question involves a kind of circularity.  Frankfurt writes that it involves “a rather 
obvious sort of circularity” (RL 24) and when Heidegger writes that “an entity [Dasein] whose 
own being is itself an issue has, ontologically, a circular structure” (BT 195), he means to 
capture (in his own terminology and among other things) the circular structure of the practical 
question. 
To say that the practical question has a circular structure is to deny that it can be 
intelligibly posed from any kind of original position or stance of detached neutrality.  Someone 
can only pose the question of who and how to be – and press reflectively into the future – from 
out of a substantive prior orientation provided by the way that things already matter.  This 
“already” captures the temporal dimension of the past.   Where you are going is shaped by where 
you are coming from.  Your past does not “follow along after” you, Heidegger claims; it “always 
already goes ahead” of you (BT 41).   
The prior orientation required for any meaningful posing of a practical question reflects 
and anticipates the answer that will be given to it.  Being able to pose the question means you 
have already got a grip on its possible answer (Frankfurt 2006a: 23).  The question cannot be 
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meaningfully posed in abstraction; it seeks a concrete answer, and it does so by an evaluation of 
a definite range of possible ways of living and final ends that are already intelligible and 
appealing (otherwise they would not show up in the deliberation in the first place).  Frankfurt 
makes these points helpfully: 
In order for a person to know how to determine what is important to himself … he must 
already know how to identify certain things as making differences that are important to 
him. Formulating a criterion of importance presupposes possession of the very criterion 
that is to be formulated. (RL 25-26) 
In deliberating about how to go on, the person does not decide what is important to him, but finds 
himself already finding it important (RL 26).  Similar to Heidegger’s arguments against a 
conception of freedom as a liberty of indifference (BT 183), Frankfurt compellingly criticizes the 
notion of freedom as unconstrained choice: 
Unless a person makes choices within restrictions from which he cannot escape by 
merely choosing to do so, the notion of self-direction, of autonomy, cannot find a 
grip…[and] the decisions and choices he makes will be altogether arbitrary. They cannot 
possess authentically personal significance or authority, for his will has no determinate 
character (Frankfurt 1999c: 110). 
 
Frankfurt and Heidegger, though, understand the significance of the preceding dimension of 
selfhood in drastically different ways.  
According to Frankfurt, the circularity of the practical question shows “that the question 
is systematically inchoate” and that, if it is able to be intelligibly posed and answered, it must be 
grounded in and oriented by some factually stable aspect of the person’s identity about which no 
normative questions can be raised (RL 25).  Richard Moran, in his review of Frankfurt’s The 
Reasons of Love, helpfully explains what is wrongheaded about this claim.   
Certainly the inquiry about how to live must begin somewhere…And it is also true that 
any such inquiry must begin with a provisional sense of “the criteria on the basis of 
which the exploration is to be pursued.” But it’s not obvious that this makes the question 
itself “systematically inchoate,” any more than ordinary theoretical inquiry is inchoate 
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since it must begin with, and rely on, an initial set of beliefs and standards for making 
progress.  This would amount to begging the question being raised only if the resultant 
inquiry did not allow for revision or correction of the assumptions with which it began.  
Similarly, it may be agreed that the normative question of how to live cannot get going 
without a provisional answer to the factual question of what one indeed cares about, but 
so far that is just a reason to begin the inquiry there, not to give the factual questions any 
other priority. (Moran 2007: 468) 
From the Heideggerian perspective, Moran shows in this passage that the circular structure of the 
practical question is an instance of the more general phenomenon involved in any understanding 
whatsoever:  the hermeneutic circle. A brief explanation of Heidegger’s understanding of the 
hermeneutic circle will help us begin to clarify the differences between Heidegger and Frankfurt. 
Understanding is a temporally articulated event with both a past and a futural dimension.  
It is easiest to explain this with reference to linguistic understanding, although Heidegger sees a 
general structure here that also holds for our understanding of the equipment we deal with in our 
daily life, as well as our understanding of ourselves and our situation of action.  Understanding 
always proceeds out of a pre-given context (the dimension of the past, or what Heidegger calls 
“having-been-ness” [Gewesenheit]) on which a person has a more or less stable and explicit 
grasp and in terms of which he forms certain anticipations regarding what is coming next (the 
dimension of the future, what Heidegger calls “projection”).   The better your prior grasp on 
(your “pre-understanding” of) the context, the better you will be able to make sense of the 
content.  So, for example, it is much easier to understand a conversation you hear between two 
people (especially if it is in a language which is not your native tongue) if you already 
understand something about the subject matter and have a sense of the positions and 
commitments held by the interlocutors.   
Next, part of the experience of understanding is the satisfaction of a more or less vague 
anticipation of what is coming next.  If you are understanding the words you are reading right 
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now, the words and phrases that immediately follow next will not come as a shock.  The more 
you read of a book or listen to someone speak, the more you know about where he is coming 
from and the better you can anticipate what he will say next, where he is going; this is why 
reading a book or watching a movie twice or three times can be such a different experience; the 
pre-understanding in terms of which you initially approach the text gets enriched and altered 
with each repetition.   
The projective or anticipatory aspect of understanding normally is so much a matter of 
course that it is not noticed.  It becomes evident in cases of breakdown, when your anticipations 
fail to be satisfied.  In such a case of conversational breakdown we might say, “I thought I knew 
where you were going with that, but now I’m not following you anymore.”   These expressions 
track the futural dimension of understanding, what Heidegger calls “projection” [Entwurf].  
Gadamer’s comment on this is helpful: 
A person who is trying to understand a text is always projecting.  He projects a meaning 
for the text as a whole as soon as some initial meaning emerges in the text.  Again, the 
initial meaning emerges only because he is reading the text with particular expectations 
in regard to a certain meaning.  Working out this fore-projection [Vorentwurf], which is 
constantly revised in terms of what emerges as he penetrates into the meaning, is 
understanding what is there. (Gadamer 2004: 269) 
 
When we no longer follow the meanings being presented to us, we need to readjust ourselves and 
revise the initial grasp on the situation that gave rise to our frustrated anticipation, that is, we 
need actively to appropriate our “projections” and attempt to figure out why we have 
misunderstood and formed faulty and unsatisfied anticipations of meaning.  As Moran put it, this 
is the moment in which we tend to a “revision or correction of the assumptions” in terms of 
which we were initially oriented in the conversation or inquiry.  In Heidegger’s view, this is the 
work of interpretation, which he describes as the active development or cultivation [Ausbildung], 
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working-out [Ausarbeitung], appropriation [Zueignung], and making-determinate [Bestimmen] 
(BT 188, 203, 89) of the pre-understanding at work in our initial grasp of our situation.  Those 
interpretive determinations or appropriations accordingly feed back into our sensitivity to the 
context and then serve to aid the generation of more precise and adequate understanding and 
anticipations of meaning. This is, abstractly speaking, how the process of coming to a better 
understanding by way of an interpretation works. 
As Frankfurt saw with respect to the particular case of practical deliberation, all processes 
of coming to an understanding involve a projective (future-oriented) determination of meaning 
based on one’s prior understanding of the context in which he already finds himself (past-
oriented).  But, according to Heidegger, the fact that one’s deliberation concerning what to do 
(and one’s understanding of written and spoken language) is always pre-structured in terms of a 
prior substantive understanding of oneself and one’s situation does not reveal any special 
problem in need of a solution as Frankfurt thinks.  As a structural feature of understanding and 
interpretation itself, the hermeneutic circle is not a threat to the intelligibility of the practical 
question and it is not something to be avoided, straightened-out, or grounded in some deeper 
fact.  In Heidegger’s words: “What is decisive is not to get out of the circle, but to come into it in 
the right way…It is not to be reduced to the level of a vicious circle, or even a circle which is 
merely tolerated” (BT 195).  Frankfurt does seek to get out of the circle. He does so by 
conceiving the most basic personal commitments presupposed in any concrete posing of the 
practical question on the model of naturalistic facts foundational for the normative and 
existential space of human everyday life.     
 
5.  Frankfurt’s Misunderstanding of the Circular Structure of Care 
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From the hermeneutically sensitive premise that practical reflection operates within a 
prior orientation in which the person already finds himself and which he cannot freely or 
rationally choose, Frankfurt draws the following unjustified conclusion:  
The most fundamental question for anyone to raise concerning importance cannot be the 
normative question of what he should care about. That question can be answered only on 
the basis of a prior answer to a question that is not normative at all, but straightforwardly 
factual—namely, the question of what he actually does care about.  (Frankfurt 2006a: 23-
24, my underlining, italics in the original; see also RL 26)  
 
Conceiving our basic commitments on the model of “straightforward facts” not only allows 
Frankfurt to plug up what he mistakenly regards as a problematic regress; it supports one of the 
most important theses involved in his battle against conceptions of human agency and selfhood 
that are “excessively intellectualized or rationalistic” (Frankfurt 2002: 184).  The claim is that a 
person’s deepest commitments (“volitional necessities”) are not based in any – actual or possible 
– consideration of the reasons supporting them.  Frankfurt asserts that “loving is not the 
rationally determined outcome of even an implicit deliberative or evaluative process” (Frankfurt 
2006a: 41).  On the contrary, loving is the factual basis for any practical reasons a person has, “it 
is the ultimate ground of practical rationality” (RL 56).  By construing basic commitments on the 
model of natural facts, Frankfurt thereby seals them off from being grounded in reasons and 
secures the foundational status he wants to attribute to them, thus chagrining the rationalist.   
In order to support the idea that our prior fundamental commitments are best seen on the 
model of a factuality and located totally without the space of normativity, Frankfurt appeals to 
what become in his later writings his central paradigms for the logic (or lack thereof) of being 
identified with one’s commitments and motivations: a person’s “commitment to the continuation 
of [his life], and to the well-being of [his] children” (RL 29).  Questions of justification or 
evaluation do not arise here because these most basic commitments are “biologically embedded” 
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and thus “determined for us by biological and other natural conditions, concerning which we 
have nothing much to say” (RL 30, 48).  Driving this point home, Frankfurt adds that the love of 
living is a “prerational urge” (Frankfurt 2006a: 37) with a special foundational status:  
[O]ur interest in staying alive has enormous scope and resonance.  There is no area of 
human activity in which it does not generate reasons… Self-preservation is perhaps the 
most commanding, the most protean, and the least questioned of our final ends.  Its 
importance is recognized by everyone and it radiates everywhere. (Frankfurt 2006a: 35) 
 
How is the importance of staying alive supposed to “radiate everywhere”?  I can see that love of 
living gives me reason to look both ways when I cross the street and to avoid drinking bleach, 
but how does love of living “give rise to the more detailed interests and ambitions that we 
develop in response to the specific content and course of our experience” (Frankfurt 2006a: 38)?  
Frankfurt’s point comes across more clearly when we see it in the context of a criticism 
he makes of Bernard Williams.  According to Williams, the primitive drive to go on living that 
Frankfurt claims is rock bottom itself needs to be sustained by the person’s having certain 
fundamental projects or “categorical desires” which make life worth living at all for him, i.e., 
which settle the question of whether or not they have any interest in just staying alive in the first 
place (Williams 1973 and 1981).  For Williams, life itself is not a meaningful final end. Our 
interest in staying alive derives from our investment in certain projects and relationships.  
Frankfurt’s view is directly opposed to Williams’s: “Surely Williams has it backward.  Our 
interest in living does not commonly depend upon our having projects that we desire to pursue.  
It’s the other way around.  We are interested in having worthwhile projects because we do intend 
to go on living, and we would prefer not to be bored” (Frankfurt 2006a: 36-37).  With this, we 
can now turn to Heidegger’s version of the relations between care, death, and time.  
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6.  Heidegger on the Circularity of Care 
 
Like Frankfurt, Heidegger emphasizes the receptive aspect of our identities.  Things 
already matter to us.  We do not answer the question of who and how to be by standing back and 
neutrally choosing or endorsing which identities to have.  Prior to all of that we already find 
ourselves with – or, in Heidegger’s phrase, we are already thrown into – a richly textured 
practical orientation whose motivational efficacy does not depend on our being aware of it or 
seeing reasons for it.  For Frankfurt, this prior orientation is conceived primarily from the 
perspective of what matters to me, in the first person singular, whereas for Heidegger, a person’s 
prior practical orientation has to do with what tends to matter to us, in the first person plural 
(though, as we’ll see, Heidegger uses the third person singular – what matters to “one” – to make 
his point). 
According to Heidegger, I get the prior orientation in terms of which I am able to pose 
and answer the question of who and how to be not by a brute instinctual endowment, but by 
having been socialized into an everyday normal way of doing things, of understanding what is 
important and appropriate, and by non-reflectively taking over a range of identities which 
express the normal way one does things.  “The one” [das Man] is Heidegger’s substantivized 
term for the functioning of social normativity; it comes from such phrases as “One eats noodles 
with a fork; One drives on the right side of the road; One uses chalk to write on the chalk board, 
not to write on the wall or to throw at students,” and so on.  Heidegger writes: 
From the world [Dasein] takes its possibilities, and it does so first in accordance with the 
way things have been publicly interpreted by the one. This interpretation has already 
restricted the possible options of choice to what lies within the range of the familiar, the 
attainable, the respectable—that which is fitting and proper. (BT 239) 
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The shared everyday way of understanding what is important and appropriate tends to orient us 
in the world without our being reflectively aware of it as such, behind the back of our self-
consciousness; it operates tacitly with “inconspicuousness and unascertainability [Unauffälligkeit 
und Nichtfeststellbarkeit]” (BT 164), and thus with a self-evidence or “instinct-like” immediacy.   
Heidegger worries that this everyday inherited way of understanding ourselves enables and 
encourages us to avoid a real, eigentlich, confrontation with the question of who I am and what 
finally matters, and tends to pressure one to absorb oneself in more or less trivial and self-
instrumentalizing forms of taking care of our “urgent” everyday business and daily grind.  As an 
unavoidable feature of human identity, this tendency is a built-in liability, a tendency towards 
living out my life, not in terms my own best sense of what really matters and what this particular 
situation calls for from me, but in terms of the safe and conventional thing that one does.8  
 Heidegger calls this “fallenness”:  “Dasein has, in the first instance, fallen away from 
itself as an authentic ability-to-be its self” (BT 220).  As such, the person allows the question of 
who and how to be to be answered by what “one does”:  “The one … supplies the answer to the 
question of the ‘who’ of everyday Dasein” (BT 165-166).  This condition is what Heidegger calls 
“inauthenticity,” [Uneigentlichkeit].  It is a “socialized” version of heteronomy, a matter of being 
moved into action by socially imposed and sanctioned motivations with which the person 
himself does not finally identity. 
In the Heideggerian view, a person’s own experience of Frankfurtian wholehearted 
identification with such social motivations cannot be taken at face value.  A person may have the 
experience of being identified with effective motivations of “the one” (they can be so obvious 
that questions do not arise), yet nevertheless be alienated from these determining grounds of his 
action (they may not reflect his own best sense of his final commitments and what is to be done 
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in a particular situation of action).  According to Frankfurt’s later view, the mark of being 
identified with one’s motivations and thus of being autonomous, is “satisfaction,” which amounts 
to a lack of “interest in making changes” (Frankfurt 1999b: 104).  Frankfurt compares 
satisfaction to being relaxed (Frankfurt 1999b: 105, n.16).  Yet, for Heidegger, two features of 
inauthenticity are: (1) tranquilization [Beruhigung] (BT 222), and (2) Untroubled indifference 
[unbehelligten Gleichgülitigkeit] (BT 299).  A person with such comfort “has no urge for 
anything,” Heidegger writes, adding that such self-satisfaction  “demonstrates most penetratingly 
the power of [self-] forgetting in the everyday mode of concern which is closest to us” (BT 396).  
Going along with the habits and routines of one’s social milieu may feel perfectly natural and 
relaxing, but that should not be taken as conclusive evidence of being identified with them.  Such 
a satisfaction with what one does may actually be a symptom of a failure, a “forgetfulness” 
regarding the challenge to actively appropriate my own individual identity and ultimate 
commitments.  
Hence, although Heidegger and Frankfurt both prioritize a person’s receptive sense of 
how things already matter, they conceive of the significance of the preceding dimension of our 
identities in thoroughly different ways.   Frankfurt overlooks the social aspect of human agency 
that preoccupies Heidegger and that figures into his hermeneutic conception of the circular 
structure of human identity.  Lacking any other resources for combatting the claims of the 
rationalistic conceptions of the self he opposes, Frankfurt ends up conceiving of the preceding, 
receptive dimensions of identity on the model of natural instinct, identification with which 
supposedly provides an ultimate, spade-turning foundation for individual identity and practical 
normativity.  Heidegger conceives of the prior and receptive practical orientation in terms of a 
tacitly operative and socially shared sense of appropriate and acceptable patterns of conduct, 
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what one does.  Doing so importantly re-frames the issue of whether or not a person identifies 
with his or her basic, pre-reflective motivations, because the practical orientation provided by 
our social upbringing can seem so natural and a matter of course that questions do not arise about 
it.  But this is no guarantee of our being identified with such motivations.    
Heidegger’s view, then, leads him to pose the question concerning the possibility of 
identification with the preceding social dimensions of identity that mediate our individual self-
understanding.  Heidegger’s response to this issue leads him to a reflection on the basic futural 
dimension of human life:  its directedness towards death.  This offers a suggestive parallelism 
and subtle corrective to Frankfurt’s appeal to the supposedly foundational role played by an 
instinctual fear of death.   
Whereas Frankfurt argues that the substantive identity of the individual self gets its pre-
rational ultimate grounding in an instinctual avoidance of death, Heidegger argues that human 
identity can never bottom-out in such ultimate facts.  Yet, in Heidegger’s picture too, death is 
somehow the source of importance in the world.  Moreover, appreciating my special relation to 
my own impending death is what enables me to be released from the satisfying, instinct-like grip 
of my taken for granted everyday motivations, and thus provides the possibility of being more 
fully receptive to my own unstable sense of what and how things finally matter so that I ay 
express that in my activities.  I qualify this as an “unstable” sense in order to highlight a crucial 
aspect of Heidegger’s conception of death and human finitude: no sense of what matters, no 
matter how self-evident or satisfying it may be, can be taken as the ultimate, brute ground of 
identity that Frankfurt is looking for.  In order to spell all of this out in more detail, we have to 
turn to Heidegger’s conception of death.9    
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7. Heidegger on Death and the Importance of Being Finite 
  
 We should first note the distinction Heidegger makes between “death” conceived  (1) as 
the event of the cessation of biological functions of plants and animals, what he calls “perishing” 
[Verenden] (BT 284), (2) as a significant event that inevitably happens at the end of a person’s 
life, what he calls “demise” [Ableben], and (3) death as “a way of being,” what he calls, 
variously, “dying” [Sterben], “being-towards-the-end”  [Sein zum Ende], and “being-towards-
death”[Sein zum Tode] (BT 291 and §§50- 51).    
Heidegger describes death as the final ‘end’ [Ende] of Dasein (BT 276).  To be towards 
this end is to be an essentially finite [endliche] entity.  To be finite in Heidegger’s sense is to 
relate to your own being as something that matters and calls you to give it significance (a stand 
on who you are and how you are going to be).  In Heidegger’s words, to be finite is for your own 
being to be an issue for you, to be ever at stake for you.  It is our understanding of the fact that 
our lives end in demise that makes it possible for things to be important to us.  Importance 
obtains only in a world of mortals (beings who perish) who understand that they are going to die 
(beings who demise); these are the beings who exist in the manner Heidegger calls “being-
towards-death.”10 
Heidegger’s claim that Dasein’s way of being is a finite being-towards-its-death is 
essentially a reformulation of the basic claim that Dasein’s own being is an issue for it, the claim 
that to be a person is to to be always and unavoidably faced with the questions: Who am I? How 
should I be?  This doesn’t mean that we are always anxiously going around like a character in a 
Woody Allen movie in a state of existential breakdown, wondering what the meaning of it all is.  
Rather, the question of who I am is never settled once and for all, as though it were a question of 
observer-independent fact.  For Heidegger, to be open to the possible revision of my 
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commitments and sense of identity is a sign of hermeneutic health, not of identity-undermining 
ambivalence.   
With his conceptions of demise and death I see Heidegger trying to get at the following 
train of thought.  Coming to appreciate the fact that inevitably my life will come to an end can 
result in a relativization of the trivial vis-à-vis what calls me as important and worthwhile.11  I 
get a better grip on what is of final importance to me and actually makes my life worth living and 
I experience a call to give myself an identity in terms of that rather than letting my identity be 
determined by unquestioned ideals and prejudices concerning what is important, what one should 
do.  In short, the fact that I will perish and meet my demise gives me something to do, for it is 
because I die that my own being can matter to me in a special way.  Living only matters because 
we die.    
From the Heideggerian perspective, the very fact that there are significant differences 
between what is worthwhile for us and what is trivial is grounded in the fact that we will all, in 
Raymond Chandler’s words, “sleep the big sleep.”  Life is not in itself a worthwhile final end 
and source of meaning, at least not without respect to its ultimate termination in death.  This is 
what we can call “the importance of being finite.”  I will now sketch out the position that I think 
is behind Heidegger’s emphasis on death and the importance of being finite. I’m aware that 
being totally convinced by the following “argument from the importance of being finite” would 
involve some auxiliary assumptions that I don’t defend here, but it nevertheless helps to capture 
the spirit of Heidegger’s conception of death and its relation to time for our present purposes.   
 First, when something matters to you, this is not only an affective state; it involves a 
temporally articulated pragmatic disposition.  Mattering is a matter of what you do when.  
Mattering consists in how the commitment in question has an effect on what you do and when, 
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how your projects are prioritized and hierarchized in time. Second, it is because we have an 
essentially limited amount of time in life — because we will meet our demise — that we have 
the need to give our time and activities a hierarchical structuring.  If you had unlimited time as 
an immortal you would have no pressure to do something now rather than later.  It would not 
matter when you do what, or what you do when.  You could do it all later.  
It is the definite limit imposed by demise that puts the felt pragmatic pressure on our 
time, the pragmatic pressure to relativize the trivial.  Without such limitation significant 
differences, pragmatically speaking, are leveled; it would become practically impossible for one 
thing to matter more than another, because it would not essentially matter when you do one thing 
rather than another.  This is why living itself is not the source of value, life is not itself the 
ultimate source of our interest in having worthwhile projects.  Death is.  Death is the background 
against which the distinction between trivial and worthwhile can show up.  Death is our deadline.  
 Heidegger’s view of “inauthentic everydayness” as bogged down in instrumental 
trivialities is directly connected to his view that it promotes a “constant tranquilization about 
death” (BT 298).  The tranquilization is expressed in the everyday attitude to death that presents 
it as a neutral, third-person event: “One of these days one will die too, in the end; but right now it 
has nothing to do with us” (BT 297).  In such an attitude the impending fact of my own death is 
avoided, I live life as if I were immortal, and can come back to what really matters to me later.     
The proper “authentic” [eigentlich] response to human mortality, the response in which 
the inevitability and finality of death is grasped as the source of importance such that it pervades 
and temporally structures one’s way of life, is what Heidegger calls “anticipation” [Vorlaufen].  
Anticipation involves becoming receptive to and getting a grip on your “ownmost” possibilities: 
those things and activities that finally matter for their own sake according to you (see BT 308 
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and 435).  Living authentically means structuring your everyday activities in terms of such 
commitments, yet at the same time living in light of the possibility that you may fail at them, or 
that you may have to reject, revise, or re-hierarchize them.  You have no ultimate foundation for 
your identity. 
 
8. Conclusion  
The point of the foregoing account of Heidegger’s conception of human finitude was to 
explain how he maintains a point that is one of Frankfurt’s animating concerns, and does so 
without a misguided appeal to a supposedly foundational instinct for self-preservation. The 
Frankfurtian concern is to explain how there can be a distinction between final ends that matter 
for their own sake and define a person’s identity, on the one hand, and trivial or merely 
instrumental ends, on the other.  The mode of agency that manifests the former is agency that is 
both autonomous and meaningful, what Frankfurt calls “self-identified,” and what Heidegger 
calls “authentic.”   
Heidegger’s conception of the importance of being finite provides a compelling 
alternative to Frankfurt’s claim that all importance ultimately “radiates” from biologically 
embedded foundational instinct for self-preservation.  We have seen how Frankfurt was driven to 
the instinct-model of care because of a misunderstanding of the significance of the hermeneutic 
circle and the fact that we cannot choose and thus always presuppose a sense of what is finally 
important.  The fact that something is always presupposed in the posing of the practical question 
does not grant it any special or fundamental priority, only a provisional one.  Heidegger builds 
directly into his view a recognition of the fact that, in the course of living and struggling with the 
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question of who and how to be, a person may be lead radically to revise the most basic aspects of 
his or her own self-understanding, even perhaps the commitment to staying alive.  Previously 
unquestioned or unquestionable identities might have to be “taken back” (BT 355) or “given up” 
(BT 443) in accordance with the demands of a particular situation or in favor of what comes to 
grip the person as a higher end.   These are the risks and challenges that accompany the 
importance of being finite. 
 
                                                             
1 I’ll refer to Heidegger 1962 (Being and Time) as “BT” from now on. 
 
2  The “for-the-sake-of-which” [das Worumwillen] is Heidegger’s name for the substantive final 
ends or commitments that define a person’s identity. See (Heidegger 2009: §11) where he 
explicitly connects his notion of the “for-the-sake-of-which” [das Worumwillen] to Aristotle’s 
conception of final ends. 
3 I’ll refer to Frankfurt 2006b (The Reasons of Love) as “RL” from now on. 
4 This is almost exactly how Ernst Tugendhat interprets Heidegger’s conception of “inauthentic 
fallenness,” which we will discuss below.  See Tugendhat 2001: 81. 
5 I divide Frankfurt’s work into an early, middle, and late period.  The periods can be 
differentiated according to the way he conceives of the phenomenon of identification and the 
primary examples he uses in his explanation of it.  In the first or early phase, the example is that 
of a willing addict who is moved irresistibly by his physiological addiction to nicotine but who 
desires, that is, prefers, to be so moved.  In the second or middle phase, Frankfurt’s favored 
example is Martin Luther who is also moved into action irresistibly by means of a necessity, not 
of physiological addiction, but of personal commitment of the deep kind that Frankfurt calls 
“volitional necessity.”  Luther is irresistibly and yet willingly impelled by his most cherished 
commitments to an act of protest, and in doing so expresses his sense of what is most important.  
In Frankfurt’s third or late phase, Luther drops out and the privileged examples become the 
parent who, given his biological make-up, irresistibly loves his children, or the person who, 
given his natural instincts, irresistibly loves life and has an uncontrollable urge to stay alive.    
6 Heidegger also comes to see boredom as a phenomenon of human being with rich existential 
implications. This is not a coincidence, but there is no space here to discuss the significance of 
this overlap.  For Heidegger’s analysis of boredom, see Heidegger 1995.   
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7 For more on the “primitive human need” of psychic self-preservation, see Frankfurt 1999a: 88-
89, and Frankfurt 1999d: 139.   
8 See Rousse 2013 for a detailed explanation of how Heidegger’s focus on the social dimensions 
of human identity deeply shapes his account of agency, motivation, and answerability.  
9 Among recent interpretation of Heidegger’s conception of death, the view I present here is 
close to those sketched by Wrathall 2005 and Richardson 2012. 
10 By claiming a pivotal role for the event of demise in Heidegger’s understanding of the 
significance death, I am going against the grain of some of the best recent Heidegger scholarship 
on this issue.  See, for example, Thomson 2013 and Schear 2013. Both Thomson (p. 217) and 
Schear (p. 365) construe Heideggerian death as a world-collapse (collapse of the intelligibility of 
a way of life), which has little to do with the common sense understanding of death as the event 
that happens at the end of life.  John Richardson also criticizes other interpreters for construing 
Heideggerian death in a way that implausibly “takes it out of any direct relation to the 
biographical event of death” (Richardson 2012: 146-147, n.15).  Richardson, like me, argues 
explicitly that the impending event of demise plays a crucial role in Heidegger’s account 
(Richardson 2012: 152). 
11  Here I am indebted to helpful conversations with Cristina Lafont.  I am also grateful for 
conversations and exchanges with Roman Altshuler, Hubert Dreyfus, Axel Honneth, Michael 
Sigrist, and audiences at Berkeley, the American Philosophical Association in San Francisco, 
George Washington University, Northwestern University, and the University of Frankfurt. 
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